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Abstract
We study the problem of semi-supervised anomaly detection with domain adap-
tation. Given a set of normal data from a source domain and a limited amount
of normal examples from a target domain, the goal is to have a well-performing
anomaly detector in the target domain. We propose the Invariant Representation
Anomaly Detection (IRAD) to solve this problem where we first learn to extract a
domain-invariant representation. The extraction is achieved by an across-domain
encoder trained together with source-specific encoders and generators by adversar-
ial learning. An anomaly detector is then trained using the learnt representations.
We evaluate IRAD extensively on digits images datasets (MNIST, USPS and
SVHN) and object recognition datasets (Office-Home). Experimental results show
that IRAD outperforms baseline models by a wide margin across different datasets.
We derive a theoretical lower bound for the joint error that explains the performance
decay from overtraining and also an upper bound for the generalization error.
1 Introduction
Also known as novelty detection or outlier detection, anomaly detection (AD) is the process of
identifying abnormal items or observations that differ from what is defined as normal. Anomaly
detection has been applied in many areas, including cyber security (detection of malicious intrusions),
medical diagnosis (identification of pathological patterns), robotics (recognize abnormal objects), etc.
Anomaly detection with different settings have been studied, for example, many anomaly detection
works aim to solve the semi-supervised learning problem such that only normal data are available for
training (Ruff et al., 2018; Bergman & Hoshen, 2020; Yang et al., 2020a). The anomaly detection
models are expected to learn an anomaly score function A(·) such that during testing anomalous data
should be assigned higher anomalous scores than the examples labelled as “normal.”
In practical applications, the normal data distribution can have a shift. For example, in manufacturing,
we have sufficient amount of “normal” observations of engine type A (source domain) and we want
to design an anomaly detection algorithm for a different but similar engine type B (target domain).
However, we may have only limited normal observations for the target domain. One option is to
re-collect a large-scale normal dataset in the new domain, however, this is often prohibitively costly
and time-consuming for many practical applications, e.g., medical healthcare and autonomous driving
(Ganin & Lempitsky, 2015; Zhao et al., 2019). Can we design a system that can leverage data from
the both domains to learn an efficient anomaly detection model for the target domain? In this paper
we attempt to address this important and interesting question. This type of problem is also known as
Domain Adaptation (DA), which studies the transfer learning between the source and target domains
(Bousmalis et al., 2016; Sankaranarayanan et al., 2018; Hoffman et al., 2017; Zhao et al., 2019).
Surprisingly, domain-adapted anomaly detection has not drawn as much interest as its classification
peer, especially comprehensive studies on semi-supervised anomaly detection in the domain adap-
tation setting are rare. As an effort to solve the problem, we propose the Invariant Representation
Anomaly Detection (IRAD) model. IRAD leverages a shared encoder to extract common features
from source and target domain data. The shared encoder is adversarially trained with a source-domain
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specific encoder and a generator. Such design is required to avoid overfitting the target domain where
training data are very limited. Then a simple and off-the-shelf anomaly detection model, Isolation
Forest (IF), is trained on the extracted shared representations of source and target domain. At test
time, the trained IF assigns the anomalous scores given the extracted features from the test target data.
We evaluate IRAD thoroughly on cross-domain anomaly detection benchmarks. Evaluation datasets
are transformed from standard digit datasets (MNIST, USPS and SVHN) and Office-Home domain
adaptation datasets. We compare IRAD to baselines including the prevailing anomaly detection mod-
els and competitive domain adaptation algorithms. Evaluation results show that IRAD outperforms
the baseline models by significant margins. For example, on Office-Home dataset (Product→Clip
Art), IRAD improves upon the best baseline by almost 10%. In addition, we derive a lower bound
on the joint error on both domains for models based on invariant representations, which explains
the observation that over-training the invariant feature extractor hurts the generalization to the target
domain. We also obtain a generalization upper bound that reveals the sources of generalization error.
We conduct ablation studies to confirm the effectiveness of objective functions in IRAD.
2 Related Work
One major class of anomaly detection algorithms is generative models that learn the normal data
distribution via generation processes, e.g., autoencoders (AE) and generative adversarial networks
(GANs). Schlegl et al. (2017) train GANs (Goodfellow et al., 2014) on images of healthy retina images
to identify disease markers. Regularized Cycle-Consistent GAN (Yang et al., 2020a) introduces a
regularization distribution to correctly bias the generation towards normal data. Memory augmented
generative models (Gong et al., 2019; Yang et al., 2020b) maintain external memory units that interact
with the encoding process to store latent representations of the normal data. An emerging type of
anomaly detection methods is self-supervised models (Golan & El-Yaniv, 2018; Bergman & Hoshen,
2020). They first apply different transformations to the normal data and train a classifier to predict
the corresponding transformation. The anomaly scores depend on the classifications predictions.
Domain adaptation is to learn from source domain data together with limited information of target
domain in order to have a well-performing model on the target domain. One heavily studied direction
is the unsupervised image classification. Given labeled source-domain images and unlabeled target-
domain images, the goal is to obtain a target-domain classifier. One type of methods learns a
transformation from the source to target domain (Hoffman et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2018); some
approaches learn invariant representations between the two domains (Bousmalis et al., 2016; Tzeng
et al., 2017; Zhao et al., 2019). There are also works addressing few-shot domain adaptation with
various problem settings. Motiian et al. (2017) studies fully-supervised domain adaptation cases
where target-domain data are limited and labeled. Few-shot domain translation (Benaim & Wolf,
2018; Cohen & Wolf, 2019) learns a mapping function from source to the target domain where
limited target-domain data are given. Since the data setting is similar to IRAD, we include the one of
state-of-the-art models BiOST (Cohen & Wolf, 2019) as a baseline.
Previous works studying the task of cross-domain anomaly detection typically have different problem
setups from this paper. For example, most works assume access to labeled (both normal and abnormal)
data at least in the source domain: Chen & Liu (2014) learns a regressor using labeled source data,
which can predict the target-domain anomaly distribution from the normal distribution (estimated
from target-domain normal data). Kumagai et al. (2019) learns the conditional data distribution with
fully-supervised data in multiple target domains. A few works use only normal data in the source and
target domain. Idé et al. (2017) studies the collective anomaly detection problem, where the target
domain is one of the source domains, with a mixture of Gaussian graphical models. Yamaguchi et al.
(2019) investigates the multi-source transfer anomaly detection problem by learning normalizing
flows from target domains to the source domain. However, these works assume sufficient normal data
in the target domain are available, which can be a demanding condition to meet as mentioned before.
3 Methodology
Problem Statement We investigate the problem of semi-supervised anomaly detection in the domain
adaptation setting. For training, the learning algorithm has access to n data points {(x(i)src, y(i)src)}ni=1 ∈
(X×Y )n sampled i.i.d. from the source domainDS and limited target data points {(x(j)tgt, y(j)tgt)}ntj=1 ∈
2
(X × Y )nt sampled i.i.d. from the target domain Dt (where nt is small and nt  n). Let y = 0
(y = 1) denote normal (abnormal). In semi-supervised anomaly detection, we only have access
to normal data, i.e., y(i)src = 0 and y
(j)
tgt = 0. The goal is to build an anomaly score function
A(xtgt) : X → a ∈ R in the target domain. The test set consists of both normal and abnormal
target domain data. An evaluation metric of learnt models is the area under the Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curve, or AUROC, w.r.t. the true labels and anomaly scores of test examples.
3.1 Invariant Representations Extraction by Adversarial Learning
Learning the domain-invariant features is a prevailing solution for the domain adaptation problem
(Bousmalis et al., 2016; Ganin et al., 2016; Zhao et al., 2019). Similar to Bousmalis et al. (2016) and
Ganin et al. (2016), IRAD includes a shared encoder Esh to extract common features between the
source and target data. To enable an appropriate split of shared and domain-specific components,
IRAD also has a private encoder Epv in the source domain to distill source-specific components. To
ensure that the learned components actually contain useful information, we also introduce a generator
to map from the latent space to data space in the source domain Gsrc. The generator Gsrc, encoders
Esh and Epv are adversarially trained together using a discriminator Dsrc in the source domain. The
adversarial loss is given as follows:
min
{Esh,Epv,Gsrc}
max
Dsrc
Vsrc(Dsrc, Gsrc, Epv, Esh) =
Exsrc [logDsrc(xsrc)] + Exsrc [log(1−Dsrc(x′src)]+
+ Exsrc,xtgt [log(1−Dsrc(x′tgt)] + Exsrc [log(1−Dsrc(xrnd)]
(1)
where x′src = G(Epv(xsrc) + Esh(xsrc)) represents the reconstruction of the source data; x
′
tgt =
G(Epv(xsrc)+Esh(xtgt)) denotes the generation using the extracted common informationEsh(xtgt)
from the target data and private encodings from the source data; xrnd = G(z + Esh(xsrc)) is
generated using a variable z sampled from a random distribution (empirically we find N (0, 1) works
well) together with shared encodings Esh(xsrc). The xrnd term is designed to avoid the scenario
in which the private encoder is (incorrectly) so powerful that all latent information for the source
domain is encoded with Epv. By taking a random vector as part of the input, the shared encoder is
trained adversarially to capture the essential information of the source data such that the generated
xrnd is close to xsrc. We conduct an ablation study about xrnd in section 5. The discriminator Dsrc
is trained to distinguish real source data xsrc from x′src, x
′
tgt, and xrnd. The shared encoder Esh,
Epv, and Gsrc are trained to maximize the error Dsrc makes. At optimality, x′src, x
′
tgt and xrnd
should resemble real data xsrc w.r.t. Dsrc.
Besides adversarial training, we also optimize with the following cycle consistent losses:
l1 = ‖xsrc − x′src‖2 l2 = ‖xsrc − x′tgt‖2 (2)
The first loss enforces the cycle consistency property in the source data space. The second one
ensures that components extracted from the target data Esh(xtgt) are actually shared features such
that they reside in the same subspace as Esh(xsrc). The cycle consistency losses are crucial in our
experiments with high-dimensional real-world images (e.g., in Home-Office dataset where image
sizes are usually larger than 300×300×3). We speculate this is due to the instability in GAN training
for high-dimensional data (Arjovsky et al., 2017). Stronger signals like direct cycle consistency losses
should help the optimizations of generators and encoders.
3.2 Split of Private and Shared Components
The subspace of shared and private encodings of the source data should be dissimilar since they extract
different features of xsrc. For instance, in a domain adaptation problem on MNIST (source) and
SVHN (target), denoted as MNIST→SVHN, the shared encodings should learn to extract information
relevant to the digit, while the private encodings are expected to contain components about digits
style, size, etc. To enforce this characteristic, we introduce an optimization objective to minimize the
similarity between the (normalized) shared encodings and private encodings, similar to Bousmalis
et al. (2016):
ldis = ‖Esh(xsrc)TEpv(xsrc)‖ (3)
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Also, the shared encodings extracted from two domains are expected to be similar, since they should
capture the common information between the two domains. Therefore, we minimize the negative of
inner product between the (normalized) shared encodings of the source and target data:
lsim = −‖Esh(xsrc)TEsh(xtgt)‖ (4)
We show in Fig. 2 that lsim objective is essential to ensure proximity between the shared encodings
extracted from the source and target data. Without lsim, we observe that the shared encodings of the
source and target data are too far apart which undermines the performance of the anomaly detection
algorithm. More details on this ablation study will be given in section 5.
The final objective function of IRAD is the weighted sum of the losses mentioned above:
Vsrc + α(l1 + l2) + β(ldis + lsim) (5)
Empirically, we find α = 1, β = 0.5 works well and we use these values in all experiments.
3.3 Anomaly Detection
After the shared encoder is trained, we can conveniently leverage an off-the-shelf anomaly detection
algorithm A′, Isolation Forest (IF, Liu et al. (2008)), to train an anomaly detection model using the
shared representations extracted from both source and target data in the training set. The description
of IF can be found in the next section. In general, any semi-supervised anomaly detection models
can be used here. We choose IF because it is a prevailing and effective method with the standard
implementation available (Pedregosa et al., 2011); also empirically we find IF works well. We
conduct detailed comparisons between IRAD and vanilla IF in the experiments. For testing, given
a test example x, we encode the test example x to the shared subspace between source and target
space Esh(x). The anomaly score A(x) is then given as A′(Esh(x)).
4 Experimental and Theoretical Results
We evaluate IRAD extensively on various kinds of domain adaptation benchmarks. The datasets
include the MNIST digit images (source domain), SVHN and USPS. We also evaluate on the Clip Art
and Product Images domains from the object recognition Office-Home Dataset (Venkateswara et al.,
2017) with more realistic images of much larger sizes. Besides, we obtain the theoretical bounds for
joint error and generalization error of IRAD, which are consistent with experimental observations.
4.1 Digits Anomaly Detection
We test with two scenarios: the adaptation from MNIST (source) to USPS (target) and MNIST
(source) to SVHN (target). An example of datasets setup is as follows. Assume digit 0 is the normal
class. In the training phase, digit 0 from source domain (e.g., MNIST) as well as a limited number
of digits 0 from the target domain (e.g., USPS) are available. Test data contain all the categories of
digits in the target domain where digits 0 are labelled as “normal” and other digits are labelled as
“abnormal”. We use the original train/test split in the target dataset. In the digit anomaly detection
experiments, the number of target training data nt 50. In the discussion section, we experiment with
different numbers of target training data available. We compare IRAD with the following baselines:
Isolation Forest (IF) is a tree ensemble method that “isolates” data by randomly selecting a feature
and then randomly selecting a split value between the maximum and minimum values of the selected
feature to construct trees (Liu et al., 2008). The averaged path length from the root node to the
example is a measure of normality. We experiment with two types of isolation forest: IF (T) trained
with only target data; IF (S+T) trained with both source and target data.
One Class Support Vector Machines (OCSVM) is a classical anomaly detection algorithm similar
to the regular SVM. OCSVM is a kernel-based method that learns a decision function for novelty
detection Schölkopf et al. (2000). It classifies new data as similar or different to the normal data.
Similar to IF, we test with two variants of OCSVM: OCSVM (T) and OCSVM (S+T).
Bidirectional One-Shot Unsupervised Domain Mapping (BiOST) is a recent work on few-shot
domain transformation (Cohen & Wolf, 2019). BiOST learns a encoder-generator pair for each
domain respectively. Networks are then trained with across domains cyclic mapping losses and a
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KL divergence in the latent space similar to the one in Variational Autoencoder (VAE). The anomaly
score of a target data example is its reconstruction error. BiOST is a representative baseline of
methods that leverage cross-domain transformation (Hoffman et al., 2017; Yamaguchi et al., 2019).
Deep Support Vector Data Description (DSVDD) is a competitive deep learning one-class classi-
fication model for anomaly detection (Ruff et al., 2018). DSVDD projects data to a sphere in the
latent space by learning the feature encoder and the data center of the sphere. We train DSVDD on
the union of source and target domain data.
We also test with an intuitive approach by augmenting the target domain training data, denoted
as “AGT”. The data are augmented by image rotations and flipping. An IF is then trained on the
augmented data as the anomaly detector.
Table 1: Anomaly detection with domain adaptation on MNIST (source domain) and USPS (target
domain). The evaluation metric is AUROC in percent. The highest numbers are in bold.
Model DSVDD OCSVM (S+T) OCSVM (T) IF (S+T) IF (T) AGT BiOST IRAD
0 36.5±10.1 74.5±0.6 4.3±1.1 22.9±1.4 95.1±0.4 94.3±1.7 75.9±4.2 96.0±0.6
1 74.3±7.1 4.0±0.2 1.1±0.1 97.3±0.6 98.7±0.1 99.0±0.1 97.6±1.8 99.0±0.2
2 57.2±4.7 45.1±0.8 18.5±2.4 48.6±2.8 74.0±1.8 45.9±3.3 72.8±9.6 82.2±0.7
3 59.5±9.0 61.2±1.1 7.2±1.3 39.3±1.8 84.5±2.2 56.1±3.2 69.7±11 88.7±2.6
4 68.3±9.0 20.6±0.6 10.8±1.4 71.5±0.4 81.3±1.4 73.2±1.7 79.1±10 88.3±1.4
5 48.7±3.4 66.0±0.4 18.7±2.0 32.3±0.9 70.0±1.6 41.2±2.0 79.5±3.6 81.1±2.7
6 65.1±6.1 42.3±0.7 5.6±2.3 59.4±1.4 95.7±0.8 65.3±3.8 90.0±4.0 96.3±1.0
7 62.7±5.0 37.8±1.6 6.0±1.0 61.5±1.6 91.8±1.3 69.4±2.3 66.8±6.6 95.6±1.6
8 53.1±10.6 46.4±0.5 10.3±2.2 51.0±1.4 79.1±1.3 68.7±3.8 78.3±9.5 83.7±2.3
9 62.7±4.4 28.1±0.7 6.0±0.9 69.6±1.6 93.1±0.8 76.4±2.3 84.7±11 94.9±0.5
Table 2: Results on MNIST→SVHN with highest numbers in bold. The metric is AUROC in percent.
Model DSVDD OCSVM (S+T) OCSVM (T) IF (S+T) IF (T) AGT BiOST IRAD
0 51.3±1.3 50.4±0.1 47.1±0.2 49.0±0.5 54.4±0.4 53.2±0.5 56.1±1.7 56.7±2.0
1 51.7±1.2 49.5±0.1 51.0±0.2 50.4±0.4 51.8±0.6 50.7±0.5 56.7±1.8 61.0±2.0
2 51.0±0.8 49.0±0.1 49.6±0.1 50.9±0.4 51.2±0.2 50.6±0.3 53.8±1.0 56.0±0.2
3 51.7±0.3 48.8±0.1 49.7±0.3 51.0±0.1 50.6±0.3 50.0±0.4 53.7±1.1 55.8±0.9
4 50.4±0.7 49.7±0.1 51.3±0.3 49.7±0.5 51.7±0.5 50.9±0.5 54.7±1.5 55.9±1.1
5 50.5±0.4 49.8±0.1 49.5±0.2 42.9±0.2 51.3±0.4 51.0±0.2 53.9±1.1 54.1±0.8
6 49.2±0.5 50.8±0.1 49.8±0.2 48.8±0.3 52.4±0.5 51.3±0.4 55.9±1.4 56.6±1.4
7 50.4±1.1 50.1±0.2 51.3±0.2 50.1±0.5 51.9±0.4 49.5±0.6 56.3±2.0 57.0±1.3
8 50.5±2.3 50.5±0.2 50.0±0.3 49.1±0.3 51.3±0.2 50.7±0.3 53.0±0.8 54.2±0.9
9 49.8±0.4 50.7±0.2 48.8±0.3 49.2±0.3 52.3±0.4 51.7±0.5 54.4±1.1 55.9±1.4
Results for MNIST→USPS and MNIST→SVHN are presented in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively
(averaged over 10 runs). IRAD outperforms all baseline models in both domain adaptation settings.
An interesting observation is that Isolation Forest trained only on target data (IF(T)) makes a strong
baseline and is even better than both transformation-based deep-learning BiOST (with USPS as
the domain) and IF trained on both source and target data. We speculate that this is because USPS
anomaly detection itself is not an over-challenging task and IF model is highly data efficient such that
training with limited target data can produce strong performance. One explanation for the downgraded
performance of IF (S+T) (compared with IF(T)) is that the MNIST and USPS digits are from close
but still distinct distributions. MNIST data actually add noises to the training of IF and undermine
the performance. We provide a theoretical explanation for this observation in Section 4.3.
Images are preprocessed into gray scale single-channel images of size 32× 32 so that they can be
input to the same network. The shared encoder, private encoder and discriminator in IRAD follow
the configurations in standard DCGANs (Radford et al., 2015). To ensure a fair comparison, we
use the same neural network architectures in IRAD, BiOST and DSVDD (the feature extractor).
Hyperparameters are chosen by cross-validation, e.g., the size of latent representation output by
encoder is 64.
4.2 Objects Recognition Anomaly Detection
The Office-Home objects recognition dataset (Venkateswara et al., 2017) is a prevailing and chal-
lenging domain adaptation benchmark. The images are high-dimensional where the average side
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length is more than 300. We experiment with the Clip Art and Product domains. We evaluate on
ten categories that have reasonably sufficient data for evaluation in both domains, as listed in the
first column in Table 3. Object examples are shown in the appendix. We test on two experimental
scenarios: Product→Clip Art and Clip Art→Product. Since the number of images in a domain is
limited, we augment the training data in the source domain by rotations and flipping, which increases
the size of training source data by eight times. For a fair comparison, baseline models are also trained
with the augmented datasets. The number of target domain images in the training set nt = 10.
The encoders Esh and Epv in IRAD are ResNet-50 (He et al., 2016) pretrained on ImageNet where
the last layer is removed and a fully connected layer is added. The decoder is a ten-layer transpose
convolution neural networks. The discriminator Dsrc is a ResNet-18 network (without pretraining)
followed by a final layer for classification. To improve the optimization process, we use the adversarial
objective as in least-square GANs (Mao et al., 2017). To have a fair comparison, baseline models
with encoding networks, e.g., DSVDD and BiOST, also leverage the pretrained ResNet-50 as the
encoders. The size of latent representation output by encoder is 128 chosen by cross-validation.
Experimental results are shown in Table 3 and Table 4, averaged on 10 runs. In each row, we
regard the corresponding objects category as the normal class. IRAD shows strong performance
in both adaptation scenarios and outperforms all baseline models in 18 out of 20 experiments.
We will show later that cycle-consistency losses are crucial in the high-dimensional Home-Office
dataset. We speculate that due to the increased complexity in images and the generation process, the
transformation-based BiOST is not as good as in digits benchmarks.
Table 3: Experimental results of Product→Clip Art. The evaluation metric is AUROC in percent.
Model DSVDD OCSVM (S+T) OCSVM (T) IF (S+T) IF (T) AGT BiOST IRAD
Bike 51.1±2.7 50.0±0.1 50.0±0.1 45.5±1.8 57.7±3.9 55.7±2.6 52.7±0.8 85.7±2.8
Calculator 53.4±8.5 49.4±0.7 50.0±0.0 46.4±1.5 81.5±3.9 79.7±4.2 65.2±1.0 79.2±1.8
Drill 53.5±4.8 47.1±1.5 48.2±1.2 58.8±2.8 63.6±6.0 54.5±3.3 47.0±0.5 71.2±5.5
Hammer 50.3±1.7 49.3±0.7 49.2±0.5 56.8±1.1 61.9±3.4 64.4±2.3 43.7±0.9 77.0±6.0
Kettle 44.3±6.5 48.7±0.7 47.7±1.7 57.0±2.1 57.7±3.3 56.3±3.2 47.7±1.5 70.0±4.9
Knives 64.3±4.3 48.7±0.9 49.5±0.6 36.1±2.7 67.8±5.0 68.9±3.9 63.1±1.5 70.3±3.5
Pan 49.2±5.8 49.9±0.5 50.0±0.0 59.8±1.3 60.0±5.3 56.4±3.9 49.3±1.5 72.8±3.7
Paper 51.4±1.9 49.0±0.8 48.7±0.7 58.4±3.1 61.1±5.6 63.8±3.8 45.1±2.6 61.8±0.8
Scissors 49.0±8.7 48.5±0.6 48.5±1.3 59.0±1.1 62.9±3.0 66.5±3.7 38.6±0.8 70.0±3.3
Soda 48.8±5.8 49.9±0.4 50.0±0.1 50.9±1.8 56.4±7.8 57.3±8.7 56.9±0.8 63.2±4.9
Table 4: Results of Clip Art→Product with the best numbers in bold. The metric is AUROC%.
Model DSVDD OCSVM (S+T) OCSVM (T) IF (S+T) IF (T) AGT BiOST IRAD
Bike 49.4±11.6 46.2±1.2 46.5±2.2 51.4±2.0 65.5±3.69 54.0±2.5 43.0±0.6 90.3±2.6
Calculator 48.6±6.7 50.0±0.1 50.0±0.1 46.3±3.0 57.6±6.3 56.5±5.2 69.0±0.6 82.2±1.8
Drill 52.8±9.5 50.0±0.1 50.0±0.1 34.4±1.3 64.4±5.1 33.9±2.1 66.4±0.7 73.0±5.4
Hammer 44.7±9.0 47.8±0.6 48.7±0.5 81.9±1.5 80.0±1.1 79.4±1.2 50.1±0.7 84.5±2.8
Kettle 49.1±11.1 50.0±0.1 50.0±0.1 45.4±1.5 55.6±5.0 52.0±3.1 63.0±1.0 75.8±8.5
Knives 57.2±1.8 48.1±1.2 49.4±0.8 48.7±1.8 36.0±1.5 47.3±3.3 48.8±2.2 63.9±2.4
Pan 50.2±7.6 50.0±0.1 50.0±0.0 45.0±2.0 60.9±2.4 48.4±3.6 57.7±1.4 76.0±4.5
Paper 48.0±9.3 50.0±0.1 50.0±0.1 68.0±2.0 70.6±4.0 74.9± 3.2 27.4±4.0 67.4±3.4
Scissors 51.3±10.1 49.5±0.4 49.5±0.7 63.0±0.9 59.0±1.5 65.0±1.2 56.4±0.6 68.9±4.0
Soda 52.9±12.0 48.5±1.0 47.9±1.2 34.1±2.5 51.0±13 48.0±9.0 50.2±1.2 53.3±1.8
4.3 Bounds for the Joint Error and the Generalization Error
Recent theoretical works on classification domain adaptation discover that minimizing the empirical
error on the source domain can be detrimental for the model’s performance in the target domain
(Zhao et al., 2019). We observe the same phenomenon in domain-adaptation AD that overtraining
IRAD leads to less accurate detection, as shown in Fig. 1. The adaptation performance first grows
and gradually decreases after around 5 epochs. We derive an information-theoretic lower bound of
the joint error (Thm. 1) to explain this phenomenon.
We start with definitions and notations. LetDYS andDYT denote the marginal label distribution in the
source and target domain. The projection from the data space X to the latent invariant representation
space Z, induced by Esh in the case of IRAD, is denoted as g. The hypothesis (labeling) function h
is shared between two domains that map invariant representations Z to predictions Yˆ . For IRAD,
the hypothesis h is induced by the IF learned on the invariant representations (IF learns the anomaly
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function). To ease the proof process, we assume the anomaly scores are transferred to classification
probabilities, for example by applying a threshold.
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Figure 1: Overtraining to minimize the
source domain error hurts the perfor-
mance on the target domain (experi-
ments conducted on MNIST→USPS).
The above process can be denoted as the Markov chain
X
g−→ Z h−→ Yˆ (Ganin et al., 2016; Zhao et al., 2019).
Let dJS denote the JS distance which is the square root of
JS divergence (Endres & Schindelin, 2003). Let εS (h ◦ g)
and εT (h ◦ g) denote the error of the learned model in the
source and target domain respectively. Then we have the
following theorem on the lower bound for joint error (the
proofs of theorems are provided in the appendix):
Theorem 1. Suppose the Markov chains hold, then a
lower bound for the joint error on the source and target
domains is:
εS (h ◦ g) + εT (h ◦ g) ≥ 1
2
dJS(DYS ,DYT )2 (6)
Remark: Since the definitions of normal data are different
in source and target domains, dJS(DYS ,DYT ) > 0. This
term is dataset-intrinsic and independent of the learning
models. The lower bound explains the phenomenon in
Fig. 1: overtraining to minimize εS actually increases the error on the target domain εT . Learning
without adaptation (e.g. IF (S+T)) can have small εS but still large error in the target domain. This
lower bound also holds for other domain adaptation anomaly detection methods that use invariant
representations. This theorem reveals that to have a well-performing model on the target domain,
one needs to balance between learning effective invariant representations for accurate AD on the
source domain while accommodating the target domain data. This trade-off is hard to avoid and is a
consequence of our assumption that the data for T is insufficient for accurate training of the model.
We use cross-validation to estimate the optimal number of training epochs as mentioned before.
We also derive an upper bound for the generalization error. Let fS , fT be the true labeling function
for the source and target domains respectively. Let D̂S and D̂T denote the empirical source and target
distributions from source domain samples S and target domain samples T of size nt. Then:
Theorem 2. For a hypothesis spaceH ⊆ [0, 1]X , ∀h ∈ H, ∀δ > 0, w.p. at least 1− δ:
εT (h) ≤ ε̂S(h) + dH˜
(
D̂S , D̂T
)
+ 2RadS(H) + 2RadS(H˜) + 2RadT(H˜)
+ min {EDS [|fS − fT |] ,EDT [|fS − fT |]}+O(
√
log(1/δ)/nt)
where H˜ := {sgn (|h(x)− h′(x)| − t) |h, h′ ∈ H, t ∈ [0, 1]}. RadS denotes the empirical Radema-
cher complexity w.r.t. samples S (see the formal definition in the appendix).
Remark: this bound is formed by the following 5 components (left to right): (1) empirical error
on S, (2) distance between the training sets of S and T , (3) complexity measures of H and H˜, (4)
differences in labels between source and target, (5) error caused by limited target domain samples.
5 Discussion
Ablation Study of Objective Functions. To better understand the objective functions of IRAD, we
conduct the following ablation studies by removing certain terms in the training process. We first
investigate Eq. (4) that encourages the similarity between the shared encodings of the source and
target data. Ideally, the shared encodings Esh(xtgt) and Esh(xsrc) should reside in the same region.
For the purpose of illustration, we visualize Esh(xtgt) and Esh(xsrc) in 2D by linear PCA as shown
in the left sub-figures of Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(b). With the similarity objective function in Eq. (4),
Esh(xtgt) and Esh(xsrc) are close in the latent space (Fig. 2(a)); without Eq. (4), Esh(xtgt) and
Esh(xsrc) are apart (Fig. 2(b)). We also plotted the magnitude of normalized inner products between
10 Esh(xtgt) and Esh(xsrc) in the right sub-figures in Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(b). The results indicate
that optimizing with Eq. (4) indeed makes Esh(xtgt) and Esh(xsrc) close numerically.
We further study the cycle-consistency losses in Eq. (2). We find them critical in Office-Home dataset
evaluations. Training without them can lead to more than 10% decrease in performance. We visualize
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Figure 2: Ablation study (digit 7, MNIST→USPS) on the similarity objective function in Eq. (4).
Part (a) is training with Eq. (4): the left figure shows the 2D linear PCA projection of Esh(xtgt) and
Esh(xsrc). The right sub-figure shows the magnitude of normalized inner products of ten randomly
selected Esh(xsrc) and Esh(xtgt). Part (b) is trained without Eq. (4). Esh(xtgt) and Esh(xsrc) are
geometrically and numerically apart from each other in this case.
Full Model w/o Cycle-Consistency Losses w/o 𝑥!"# in Eqn. (1)
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Figure 3: (a) Invariant representations of normal (blue) and abnormal (red) target domain data. The
first and second rows are “Calculator” and “Pan” (“Product”→“Clip Art”). The first column is
training with the full model and normal and abnormal encodings are well separated. The second
column is training without the cycle-consistency losses. Third column is from removing the term
xrnd in Eq. (1). Normal and abnormal data in the two later cases are mixing, making detection hard.
(b) AUROC on MNIST→USPS with different numbers of target-domain training data. We only
present 5 digits due to the space limit; the full results are provided in the appendix.
the extracted features from the normal and abnormal target data, Esh(xnor) and Esh(xabn), in 2D
with PCA. Ideally, Esh(xnor) and Esh(xabn) should be separated so the abnormal can be detected.
This is what we observe when training with the full model (the first column of Fig. 3(a)). However,
if optimized without Eq. (2), encoded normal and abnormal data are mixing together (the second
column in Fig. 3(a)). We also investigate term xrnd in Eq. (1). Removing xrnd from the adversarial
training results in Esh(xnor) and Esh(xabn) mingling together (the third column of Fig. 3(a)). We
conjecture that for high dimensional data like images, it is challenging for the discriminator to form
an effective decision boundary (Yang et al., 2020a), therefore additional regularization terms (xrnd)
and objective functions (cycle-consistent losses) are helpful for modeling the normal data distribution.
Effects of the number of target domain training data. We investigate the performance of IRAD
w.r.t. the number of available target-domain training data nt. The results are presented in Fig. 3(b)
with nt = 10, 20, 50, 100. IRAD is able to leverage more target data to achieve better performance.
6 Conclusion
We studied the domain adaptation problem in anomaly detection. The proposed method IRAD first
learns invariant representations between the source and target domains. This is achieved by isolating
the shared encodings from domain-specific encodings through adversarial learning and enforcing
subspace similarity/dissimilarity. The domain-invariant representations are then used train an anomaly
detection model in the target domain. We show that IRAD significantly outperform baseline models
in most experiments on digits and high-dimensional object recognition datasets. We prove a lower
bound for the joint error and an generalization upper bound. Experimental observations corroborate
our theoretical results.
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Broader Impact
As described and benchmarked in this paper, IRAD should have neutral societal consequences. The
experimental benchmarks in the paper are standard academic datasets and do not involve human
subjects. It is possible however to apply these methods for video security and surveillance. Although
in principle there is no explicit bias in our algorithms, it is possible that the outcome of the prediction
be biased. This may occur if there is a bias in the training set or if the source and target domains
are biased. Generally speaking, anomaly detection algorithms applied to human subjects should be
benchmarked and validated extensively to avoid racial/gender/age/religion/disability bias and other
types of biases.
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A Experiments with different numbers of target-domain training data
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Figure 4: AUROC on MNIST-USPS experiments of all ten categories with the number of target-
domain training data nt = 10, 20, 50, 100. The model performance increases as more target-domain
data are available for training.
B Examples of images in Office-Home dataset for evaluation
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Figure 5: Examples of ten categories in Clip Art and Product domain from Office-Home dataset.
C Proof of Information-Theoretic Lower Bound:
The proof for Thm. 1 is as follows:
Proof. YS are defined as the labeling function from X to Y for the source domain and YT as the map
for the target domain. We assume that Y is 1 when the data is anomalous and 0 otherwise. Since the
JS distance is a metric, we have the following inequality:
dJS(DYS ,DYT ) ≤ dJS(DYS ,DYˆ ) + dJS(DYˆ ,DYT ) (7)
We define εS(h ◦ g) = εS(Yˆ ) as
εS(h ◦ g) = EX(|YS(X)− h ◦ g(X)|)
and similarly for εT (h ◦ g). We can bound dJS(DYS ,DYˆ ) by
√
εS(h ◦ g) (Lin (1991); Zhao et al.
(2019))
dJS(DYS ,DYˆ ) =
√
DJS(DYS ,DYˆ ) ≤
√
1
2
‖DYS −DYˆ ‖1
=
√
1
2
(∣∣Pr(YS = 0)− Pr(Yˆ = 0)∣∣+ ∣∣Pr(YS = 1)− Pr(Yˆ = 1)∣∣)
=
√∣∣Pr(YS = 1)− Pr(Yˆ = 1)∣∣ =√∣∣EX(YS)− EX(Yˆ )∣∣
≤
√
εS(h ◦ g)
12
With Eq. (7), we get:
dJS(DYS ,DYT ) ≤ √εS +√εT (8)
This can be rewritten as:
εS (h ◦ g) + εT (h ◦ g) ≥ 1
2
dJS(DYS ,DYT )2
D Proof of Generalization Upper Bound:
We start with introductions of notations and definitions. Recall
H˜ := {sgn (|h(x)− h′(x)| − t) |h, h′ ∈ H, t ∈ [0, 1]}
Let D̂ denote the empirical distribution from samples x ∼ D of size n. The empirical Rademacher
complexity is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Empirical Rademacher Complexity). LetH be a family of functions mapping from X
to [a, b]. Let S = {xi}ni=1 denote a fixed sample of size n with elements in X . Then, the empirical
Rademacher complexity ofH with respect to the sample X is defined as:
RadS(H) := Eσ
[
sup
h∈H
1
n
n∑
i=1
σih (xi)
]
where σ = {σi}ni=1 and σi are i.i.d. uniform random variables taking values in {+1,−1}.
We then have the following lemmas.
Lemma 1 (Zhao et al. (2019)). LetH ⊆ [0, 1]X , then for all δ > 0, w.p. at least 1− δ, the following
inequality holds for all h ∈ H: εS(h) ≤ ε̂S(h) + 2RadS(H) + 3
√
log(2/δ)/2n, where n is the
number of samples in S.
Lemma 2 (Zhao et al. (2019)). ∀δ > 0, w.p. at least 1− δ, the following inequality holds:
dH˜(D, D̂) ≤ 2RadS(H˜) + 3
√
log(2/δ)/2n.
With Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we can derive:
Lemma 3. For ∀δ > 0, w.p. at least 1− δ, for ∀h ∈ H˜:
dH˜(DS ,DT ) ≤ dH˜(D̂S , D̂T ) + 2RadS(H˜) + 2RadT(H˜) + 3
√
log(4/δ)/2n+ 3
√
log(4/δ)/2nt
Proof. The triangular inequality of dH˜(·, ·) is written as:
dH˜ (D,D′) ≤ dH˜(D, D̂) + dH˜(D̂, D̂′) + dH˜(D̂′,D′).
By Lemma 2, it follows that with probability ≥ 1− δ/2, the following two inequalities hold:
dH˜(DS , D̂S) ≤ 2RadS(H˜) + 3
√
log(4/δ)/2n
dH˜(DT , D̂T ) ≤ 2RadT(H˜) + 3
√
log(4/δ)/2nt
These two inequalities can be combined as with a union bound to obtain the inequality in the
lemma.
Lemma 4 (Zhao et al. (2019)). Let 〈DS , fS〉 and 〈DT , fT 〉 be the source and target domains
respectively. For any function classH ⊆ [0, 1]X , and ∀h ∈ H, the following inequality holds:
εT (h) ≤ εS(h) + dH˜ (DS ,DT ) + min {EDS [|fS − fT |] ,EDT [|fS − fT |]}
Finally, the proof of generalization upper bound Thm. 2 is given as:
Proof. Following Lemma 4, we have:
εT (h) ≤ εS(h) + dH˜ (DS ,DT ) + min {EDS [|fS − fT |] ,EDT [|fS − fT |]}
The probabilistic bounds for εS(h) are given in Lemma 1 and Lemma 3. Applying them to the
inequality above finishes the proof. The term O(
√
log(4/δ)/2n) goes away since nT  n.
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